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 Abstract 
The corporate governance environment in the UK and US is generally thought 
to be hostile to the emergence of cooperative employment relations of the kind 
exemplified by labour-management partnerships.  We discuss case study 
evidence from the UK which suggests that, contrary to this widespread 
perception, enduring and proactive partnerships may develop, in conditions 
where management can convince shareholders of the long-term gains from this 
approach, and where other regulatory factors operate to extend the time-horizon 
for financial returns.  We conclude that there is more scope than is commonly 
allowed for measures which could reconcile liquidity in capital markets with 
cooperation in labour relations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovative forms of labour-management relations emerged in the US and the UK 
during the mid-1990s as ways of capturing the benefits of cooperation between 
corporate stakeholders. The background to this was rapid technological change 
and intensifying competition in product markets, brought about by globalisation 
and, particularly in the case of the UK, privatisation. Customers learned to 
exercise their choice more aggressively and shareholders became increasingly 
impatient for a quick and profitable return on their investments. In response to 
these pressures, firms were forced to re-examine their organisational systems and 
structures in an effort to improve performance (Burchell, Ladipo and Wilkinson, 
2002). Although downsizing and business process re-engineering were part of the 
response, labour-management ‘partnerships’ were also initiated, often in the very 
same companies which had undergone substantial restructuring.  These 
arrangements led to innovations in the employment relationship, including a 
significant degree of self-management and autonomy for employees. 
 
The 1990s was also a period when corporate governance came to the fore as an 
issue both for public policy and management practice.  The idea that managers 
should act as the agents of shareholders gained ground, particularly in the 
American and British systems.  This was manifested in various ways, including 
the proliferation of corporate governance codes, the widespread adoption of 
executive share option schemes and similar forms of managerial remuneration, 
and the increasing degree to which whole industries and sectors were restructured 
through the operation of the market for corporate control (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2001).  In the process, long established mechanisms for the exercise of stakeholder 
voice – above all, employee representation in its various forms – were 
marginalized.  Thus corporate governance, while on the one hand leading 
management to favour close cooperation with labour as a means of enhancing the 
firm’s competitiveness, also intensified the pressure to prioritise short-term 
shareholder interests, thereby threatening to undermine these very same forms of 
labour-management cooperation. 
 
This paper considers how far corporate governance has come to operate as a 
constraint on the emergence and stabilization of innovative employment forms 
and cooperative strategies in the British and American economies.  The next 
section outlines the relationship between corporate governance regulations and the 
predominant norm of ‘shareholder value’ in the Anglo-Americans systems. 
Empirical evidence is then presented in the form of a report of case studies which 
have been tracking the impact of corporate governance on labour-management 
partnerships in a number of UK-based firms since the late 1990s.   
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2. What is ‘corporate governance’ and what is its relevance to employment 
and competitiveness? 
 
Corporate governance is concerned, in essence, with issues of ownership and 
control of the enterprise (Berle and Means, 1932).  ‘Ownership’ refers in this 
context to the legal allocation of property rights among the principal 
stakeholders or corporate constituencies (shareholders, creditors and 
employees), and ‘control’ to the way in which legal rules and social norms 
interact to determine the balance of power among these groups.  A legal 
perspective is important here because of the pivotal role which legal rules play 
in constituting the corporate form and in framing the options available to the 
various parties with an interest in or affected by the enterprise.  It is clear that 
legal rules do not operate in a vacuum, and that the same rules may have very 
different effects depending on the context in which they apply.  For example, 
many of the rules of Japanese corporate law are borrowed from an American 
model which was imported after 1945, and, on the face of it, they provide 
powerful legal rights to shareholders to call corporate managers to account.  In 
practice, however, shareholders have a marginal voice in Japanese corporate 
governance by comparison to the predominant role accorded, traditionally at 
least, to employees (Araki, 2004).  This is an example of a case where the 
formal law appears to be less important than norms and practices which lie 
beyond the law.  The point, from a methodological perspective, is not that legal 
rules can be ignored, but rather that it is necessary to understand how, in a given 
context, they interact with social norms to shape, over time, the expectations and 
strategies of the various parties.   
 
Corporate governance has far-reaching implications for industrial relations and 
the employment relationship. The most important of these is that management 
and labour do not simply have to deal with each other.  Both are subject to the 
wider interests of the dominant financial stakeholders who make up the 
‘residual claimants’ or ‘holders of the beneficial interest’ (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2000) in the enterprise.  In the case of large, private sector 
companies in Britain and America, these are normally the shareholders, 
although banks, in their capacity as lenders, and other creditors also play an 
important role, particularly when the firm is threatened with insolvency or has 
to operate in the shadow of insolvency law (Armour and Deakin, 2001, 2003).  
Crucial strategic choices for management in the field of labour relations, such as 
whether to resist, welcome or acquiesce in union involvement in the firm, may 
turn, to some degree, on the pressures being exercised by financial interests.  
The implications for the employment relationship may also be considerable, in 
terms of the degree of job security which the firm can offer, and the nature of 
employee involvement in the design and implementation of work systems.   
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This is not to suggest that there is necessarily a linear relationship of cause and 
effect between the framework of corporate governance which applies to a given 
organisation, on the one hand, and the type of employment practices which it 
pursues, on the other.  Causal influences may run in both directions (see Gospel 
and Pendleton, 2005, for discussion).  The rules of industrial relations and 
employment law, and a given firm’s approach to labour relations, which may be 
of long standing and resistant to change, can frame management’s options and 
thereby influence, in turn, the ownership structure of the firm.  Thus it is 
possible, for example, that rules mandating a high level of employee 
participation in certain aspects of organizational decision making, a common 
feature of the labour laws of continental Europe, may have helped to entrench a 
‘blockholder’ model, based on concentrated share ownership, in those systems. 
They may also have prevented the emergence of dispersed ownership of the 
kind observed in Britain and America, where employee consultation laws are 
weaker.  The relative weight, in this respect, of corporate law and corporate 
governance, on the one hand, and labour law and industrial relations, on the 
other, cannot be deduced from a study of the legal texts alone.  However, the 
legal nature of the relevant interests and claims, and the degree to which the 
legal-institutional system accords priority to the claims of certain stakeholders 
over others, should be taken into account in empirical studies of the relationship 
between corporate governance and organizational change. 
 
In this respect it is vital to note that different corporate forms are associated with 
different patterns of ownership (Hansmann, 1996).  A number of alternative forms 
for the enterprise can be observed within market systems, including publicly-
owned state corporations, to organizations based upon customer ownership 
(‘mutuals’), and entities owned by employees (a category which includes worker 
or producer ‘cooperatives’ as well as professional partnerships of lawyers and 
accountants).  In the case of companies limited by shares, external providers of 
risk capital – the shareholders – are said to be the ‘residual claimants,’ in the sense 
that they are entitled by law to what is left from the income stream after the 
contractual claims of employees, commercial creditors and others have been met.1  
Because they are the last to receive anything in the event of insolvency, they 
implicitly assume the risk of failure.  Conversely, shareholders gain in proportion 
to the organisation’s success.  Although, in law, they are not entitled to receive a 
dividend, in practice, the linking of dividends to corporate performance aligns 
shareholder returns directly to the success or failure of the enterprise.  They also 
benefit through the increase in the value of their shares.  
 
It is often claimed, in particular by institutional investors, that shareholders are the 
‘owners’ of the company, but this does not accurately reflect their legal position in 
either the UK or the US.  Shareholders do not own the company, nor do they own 
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its assets (Parkinson, 2003).  Nevertheless, by virtue of the rules of company law 
and corporate governance practice, the ownership of common voting stock does 
give them certain other property rights which have important implications for 
incentives and hence for efficiency.  In particular, shareholders of listed 
companies – that is, in essence, companies whose shares are traded on a stock 
exchange – can dispose of their shares in an open market, providing a way by 
which control of the corporation can be transferred. The orthodox view in the 
Anglo-American system is that market liquidity – the ability of shareholders to 
exit at low cost – enhances the organisational efficiency of the enterprise. 
Shareholders have a particularly strong incentive to monitor management, 
derived from the close link between shareholder wealth and the success or 
failure of the firm; the sale of stock is the mechanism by which this power is 
exercised.  Managerial failure is punished by a fall in investor confidence and a 
declining share price.  In effect, the stock market, once it attains a certain degree 
of liquidity, becomes a market for corporate control, in which rival management 
teams bid to persuade shareholders to sell them controlling interests by offering 
them a premium over current share prices.  
 
It can be argued that employees and other long-term stakeholders have just as 
valid an argument as shareholders for being considered the residual claimants.  
This is because they are equally likely to make relation-specific investments (in 
human capital, for example) which will be at risk if the enterprise fails (Blair, 
1995; Kelly and Parkinson, 1998; Blair and Kochan, 2000). The response of 
mainstream corporate governance theorists is that while it may be the case that 
many groups have a stake in the firm, only the shareholders have sufficient 
homogeneity of interests as a group to hold managers to account in an effective 
way (Hansmann, 1996).  From this perspective, compromises in the pre-eminent 
rights of shareholders embodied in, for example, codetermination laws and laws 
requiring employee consultation, are inherently inefficient, and survive only 
because the costs of unraveling politically-motivated compromises are too high 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001).  
 
A large proportion of US and UK productive capacity, in relative terms, is held 
in the form of listed companies.  In both systems, stock market capitalization 
has substantially exceeded national GDP since the mid-1980s (although the 
degree to which this is the case has fallen considerably following the end of the 
bull market in 2000 and subsequent stock market decline) (Gospel and 
Pendleton, 2005).  US and UK listed companies, as we noted above, are mostly 
characterised by dispersed-share ownership; that is to say, the company’s share 
capital is scattered among a large number of individual holdings, with no 
dominant or controlling interest.  This is the model described by Berle and 
Means (1932) in their seminal study.  However, to a large extent in the UK, and 
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to a lesser degree in the US, the principal shareholders are no longer households 
or individuals, but instead financial institutions, that is to say, insurance 
companies and pension funds, who act on behalf of their policy-holders and 
beneficiaries.  The day-to-day control and management of their shareholdings is 
normally given over to specialised fund managers.  Typically, the share 
structure of a UK-listed company will consist of several blocks (normally of 
around 5%, and rarely more than 10%) that are controlled by fund managers on 
behalf of a number of institutional clients.  The dominant block-holding model, 
in which one shareholder holds a majority or near-majority stake, is rare in UK 
listed companies.  Methods for securing dominant blocks through corporate 
cross-shareholdings (which until recently represented the norm in France: see 
Goyer and Hancké, 2005) and bank-led governance of the kind that has operated 
(in various different ways) in Germany and Japan (see Berglöf, 1997; Franks 
and Mayer, 1998), are not often observed in the US and the UK. 
 
In principle, as we have just seen, dispersed share ownership strongly privileges 
exit over voice as the mechanism by which shareholders can exercise control 
over management.  The disadvantage of dispersed ownership comes in the form 
of the high costs of voice: effectively coordinating the direct involvement of 
shareholders in the conduct of corporate affairs is difficult in practice. To some 
extent, this problem may be overcome through the actions of institutional 
shareholders (or, in many cases, the fund managers who represent them).  
Where a few institutions between them hold a majority or near-majority stake, 
they can often exercise a powerful if informal influence behind the scenes in the 
management of companies (see Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann, 2003).  
 
But even exit carries with it potentially high coordination costs.  The hostile 
takeover can be thought of as a mechanism for overcoming some of these costs 
in the context of share dispersion.  A hostile takeover is, in effect, an appeal to 
the shareholders of a listed company to sell a controlling interest to the bidder. 
The shareholders are induced to exit by the offer of a premium above the current 
market value of their shares, the cost of which the new owner will aim to 
recover by restructuring the company (which can be interpreted as either 
running it more efficiently, or extracting rents from employees and other 
stakeholders: see Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  In principle, the possibility of 
hostile bid being mounted should act as a powerful deterrent against under-
performance by managers.  However, the collective action costs of voting in 
response to a ‘tender offer’ of this kind are considerable, since shareholders 
have strong incentives to ‘hold out’ in the expectation of being able to extract a 
higher price near the point at which the bidder gains a controlling stake.   Thus 
regulation is essential.  Securities regulation – the body of law governing the 
issuing and trading of shares and other financial instruments – offers various 
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sets of solutions to this problem (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997).  In the US 
these take the form of federal-level securities legislation dating from the late 
1960s (the ‘Williams Act’) and relevant case law of the state of Delaware, in 
which most large companies are incorporated.  In the UK, the relevant rules 
derive from case law, certain provisions of the Companies Acts and, above all, 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover Panel, 2005a). The Code, 
like the Williams Act, dates from the late 1960s, but unlike the US Act, it is not 
embodied in statutory form, and the Panel has no direct legal powers of 
enforcement.  However, its provisions tend to be strictly observed, since UK-
based financial and legal professionals who are found to have breached the 
Panel’s rulings may be penalised.2   
 
Under the City Code, minority shareholders receive strong protection against 
expropriation by majorities during a bid. The use of two-tier offers, partial bids 
and other techniques that seek to lever a bid by offering differential terms to 
particular shareholders is highly restricted by the rules of the Code and by Panel 
practice (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997 for details).  Other rules of UK securities 
law and practice make it nearly impossible for the managers of a listed company 
to put in place advance protections against hostile bids such as the issuing of 
non-voting stock or the implementation of various ‘poison pill’ defenses that are 
much more regularly observed in the USA.  In these respects, the City Code 
reflects the strong influence of institutional shareholder interests within the UK 
financial sector, and their capacity for lobbying to maintain a regulatory regime 
which operates in their favour (Deakin and Slinger, 1997; Deakin, Hobbs, Nash 
and Slinger, 2003). 
 
The effect of minority shareholder protection rules such as those contained in 
the City Code and, to a lesser degree, in US securities law and practice, appears 
to be to encourage further dispersion of ownership.  Large cross-shareholdings 
are rare in part because under the City Code (rule 9) they would trigger an 
obligation to launch a ‘mandatory’ bid for control.  Shareholders are encouraged 
to take what are relatively small stakes by continental European or Japanese 
standards, knowing that they are in general safe from the predatory actions of 
major shareholders.  Thus the City Code is both consequence and cause of the 
emergence over time of the current pattern of share ownership in the UK, and of 
the high level of liquidity which characterizes the UK capital market. 
 
The overall effect of these legal rules and extra-legal norms is to entrench 
shareholder value as the dominant objective of corporate management.  The 
source for the so-called ‘shareholder value’ or ‘shareholder primacy’ norm is 
only partially located in company law.  Indeed, despite the association made by 
some influential analyses between the common law of the US and UK and high 
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levels of investor protection (La Porta et al. 1997, 1999, 2000), close inspection 
reveals that the law provides little or no support for the notion that companies 
are run for their shareholders as ‘owners’ of the enterprise.  Since the late 
nineteenth century, UK company law, in particular, has largely aimed to protect 
the autonomy of boards from day-to-day shareholder pressures (see Davies, 
1997: 183-187).  The legal notion that directors must act in good faith in the 
interests of the company, rather than the shareholders, means that boards have 
considerable leeway in taking a long-term view of what is in the best interest of 
stakeholders as a whole.  In the UK this is reinforced by legislation requiring 
boards to consider the interests of employees alongside those of shareholders 
when exercising fiduciary duties (section 309 of the Companies Act 1985) and 
by case-law recognising that creditors, too, have claims as residual owners when 
the company approaches insolvency (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997).   
 
In the UK, the government’s recent review of company law has confirmed that 
boards are permitted to take a view based on ‘enlightened shareholder value’ – 
which seeks to strike a balance between the competing interests of the different 
stakeholders – if their objective is to benefit the shareholders in the long run 
(Company Law Review, 1999, 2000, 2001).  For example, in most cases, it 
would be legally open to the directors to pursue a policy of minimum 
redundancies (to gain the cooperation of the workforce) or a preferred supplier 
policy (to enhance the quality of supplier relations), if the ultimate objective of 
these policies were to advance the long-term interests of shareholders. In the 
United States, in a similar vein, numerous states have enacted so-called 
constituency or stakeholder statutes which give boards leeway to balance 
shareholder concerns with the need to take into account stakeholder interests 
with a view to maintaining the long-run viability of the enterprise.   
 
However, when the impact of company law is considered together with the 
operation of securities law, the picture becomes quite different.  The leeway 
given to boards of listed companies is now much more limited.  During a bid, 
the rules of the Takeover Code require boards of target companies to assume a 
neutral stance and offer disinterested advice to shareholders on the financial 
merits of the bid (Takeover Code, rules 3.1 and 25.1, respectively). Although 
the Code requires bidders to state their intentions with regard to the future 
treatment of employees (rule 24.1), this results in little more than the insertion 
of standard-form legal ‘boilerplate’ in offer documents issued by bidders (see 
Deakin, Hobbs, Nash and Slinger, 2003: 317).  Employees, as such, have no 
standing to challenge a particular decision or commercial transaction in the 
courts on the grounds that there has been a breach of fiduciary duty by the 
board, nor do employees have any standing before the City Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers.3  There is no obligation on the part of either the target board or the 
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board of the bidder to consult employee representatives during a bid; this only 
occurs at the point when large-scale redundancies are about to take place.  There 
is has even been some doubt as to how far either board may go in providing 
information to employee representatives without contravening the provisions of 
the Code and the listing rules on the disclosure of price-sensitive information, 
although the current view of the Panel is that this objection can be overcome if 
the employee representatives give undertakings of confidentiality (see Deakin 
and Morris, 2001: 808). The overall effect of these various rules is, in principle, 
to create strong incentives for boards to prioritise short-term shareholder 
interests over other concerns when faced with a hostile bid (Deakin and Slinger, 
1997), and empirical research, based on case studies of takeovers from the mid-
1990s and interviews with bid participants, suggests that this incentive structure 
is reflected in the way boards respond to bids in practice (Deakin, Hobbs, Nash 
and Slinger, 2003).   
 
By international standards, there is a high level of hostile takeover activity in the 
UK and US.  Even so, the numbers of hostile bids in a given year will be in the 
tens rather than the hundreds, whereas the number of listed companies in each 
country runs into the thousands (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997).  More 
significant, in the UK, is the long shadow cast over corporate governance by the 
Code.  Virtually no listed company is immune from the possibility of a hostile 
bid.  To varying degrees, companies can insulate themselves against short-term 
fluctuations in their share price relative to the market by cultivating a culture of 
long-term investment.  But this is not an option open to all; and there is question 
as to whether it is continuously available to any.  In practice, the takeover 
mechanism has been the principal catalyst for corporate restructuring in both the 
US and the UK during the last two decades of the twentieth century, and 
virtually no industrial or services sector has escaped the changes induced by 
takeover activity.  In this way, it would seem that corporate governance rules 
have indeed had a major effect on the industrial structure of the British and 
American economies.  
 
The specific issue to which this analysis gives rise is whether dispersed 
shareholder ownership constrains the development of a ‘partnership’ approach 
in employment relations of the kind needed to promote competitiveness.  With 
dispersion, shareholders benefit from the possibility of low-cost exit.  The 
resulting liquidity in capital markets enables them to take advantage of 
alternative investment opportunities, and in principle permits more efficient 
resource allocation.  The disadvantage is that other stakeholders, such as 
employees, suppliers and customers contributing firm-specific inputs, knowing 
that the shareholders may switch their investments at short notice, may be 
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dissuaded from making long-term investments of their own in the firm (Franks 
and Mayer, 1998: 728).   
 
One of the very few studies to make the impact of corporate governance on 
labour-management partnerships is Kochan and Rubinstein’s study of Saturn, 
the US vehicle manufacturer which was set up as an experiment in partnership 
between General Motors and the United Auto Workers union (Kochan and 
Rubinstein, 2000).  Despite early success, the Saturn experiment proved to be 
far from trouble-free.  On the one hand, critics taking a shareholder perspective 
argued that the considerable investments made by the company in the Saturn 
plant had failed to produce an adequate return (see Monks and Minow, 2004: 
361-2).  On the other, elements within the union claimed that the abandonment 
of seniority-based payment and job security systems was an excessive price to 
pay for greater employee involvement in the design of working practices 
(Rubinstein and Kochan, 2001) Thus the message to emerge from the Saturn 
case is that the tension between the priority granted to shareholder interests by 
the US corporate governance system, and efforts to build labour-management 
partnerships which will endure over time, remains, at best, unresolved. 
 
3. The impact of corporate governance on employment relations: case-
study evidence from the UK 
 
Since the mid-1990s we have been studying a sample of UK-based firms with 
different patterns of ownership in order better to understand the relationship 
between corporate governance structures and labour-management partnerships.4  
The sample consists of companies which have all claimed, at various times, to be 
following a partnership model in relations with employee representatives.  At the 
same time they have all been actively engaged in the market for corporate control, 
resulting in periodic restructurings following mergers and takeovers. Successive 
waves of interviews were conducted with senior managers and trade union 
officials in order to track, over time, changing perceptions regarding partnership 
between labour and management.  The sample was put together with the aim of 
seeing how contrasting patterns of ownership (dispersed share ownership; 
concentrated ownership; UK control; overseas control) and different forms of 
market regulation (ranging from relatively unregulated product markets exposed 
to intense international competition, to utilities markets which are subject to 
intensive price and quality regulation) affected the emergence and stabilization of 
partnership relations.  The study, therefore, was not designed to be representative, 
but the close focus on the development, over time, of a small number of 
organizations of different types was intended to make it possible to draw out the 
role of external pressures, including regulatory and governance factors, in 
explaining the variation in managerial responses to organizational uncertainty. 
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On the basis of the interviews which formed the basis for the study, a distinction 
emerged between partnerships which, on the one hand, were ‘proactive’ and 
‘mature’, and those on the other which were ‘reactive’, ‘weak’ and ‘disintegrating’ 
(Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson, 2003, 2005). These 
characterizations were drawn from the interviewees’ own reported perceptions of 
the partnership arrangements in which they had been involved. Proactive 
partnerships were those in which the union’s role was broadly conceived in terms 
of the promotion of a high-trust culture based on functional flexibility, with 
management, in turn, providing the conditions for employees to make the 
necessary investments in human capital. In reactive partnerships, by comparison, 
the union’s role tended to be confined to dealing with the immediate consequences 
of restructurings in terms of large-scale redundancies, while management made a 
minimal commitment to employment security. Mature and enduring partnerships 
were those which survived moments of crisis caused by external pressures, in 
which both sides were willing to make relation-specific investments which would 
be put at risk if the company faced the prospect of competitive failure.  By 
contrast, weak and disintegrating partnerships were those in which the parties 
were more concerned with taking steps to minimize their exposure in the event of 
corporate failure than with engaging in a strategy of aiming for mutual gains from 
cooperation.  In this case, significant external shocks tended to lead to the 
breakdown of partnership. 
 
The case studies provide evidence that dispersed share ownership puts pressure 
on partnership in labour relations.  One of the case study companies, Tenswell, 
was a heavy-industry manufacturer producing for highly competitive, 
international markets.5  In 1998, its chairman said:  ‘[o]ur business is about 
profits and shareholder value.  If it’s jobs before shareholder interests, the 
answer is no…it simply prolongs the agony.’ In 1999, the company merged with 
a continental European competitor.  The new company listed its shares listed on 
the London and New York stock exchanges.  Within a few months, as 
deteriorating trading conditions led to a fall in profits, the company’s senior 
executive managers resigned and the former chairman took over as CEO with 
the stated aim of restoring shareholder value.  In February 2001, the company 
announced a major restructuring programme with the loss of 6,000 jobs. There 
was no prior consultation with employee representatives.  On the day of the 
restructuring announcement, the company’s share price increased by 11%.  
Trade union officials were critical of US institutional investors who, they 
argued, had put pressure on the company to take a short-term view of 
shareholder value, and who were distant from the implications for workers and 
communities of large-scale closures.  Despite a long tradition and active recent 
history of close management-union cooperation within the UK company, the 
unions perceived the radical downsizing as a breach of trust, revealing the 
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partnership to be merely ‘reactive’ and, beyond a certain point in time, more or 
less non-existent. 
 
A contrasting case is that of Cleanwell UK, a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
continental European company (Cleanwell International).  Prior to 2000, 
approximately half of the voting shares in this company were controlled by five 
main holdings, two of which were continental European public sector pension 
funds, and one a continental European bank. Cleanwell International shares 
were primarily listed on a continental European stock exchange, with a 
secondary listing on the London Stock Exchange. The trade union which 
represented employees at the UK subsidiary told us that the continental 
European model was an ‘important influence’ on the company’s approach to 
human resources and to union relations. But even under this model, the 
corporate group’s focus was on the creation of shareholder value, and its 
business objective was to double turnover, operating profit and earnings per 
share by 2005. The group’s partnership approach was, however, one of the bases 
on which it was able to commit to increasing the size of its business over the 
longer-term. The group’s 2000 annual report stressed the company’s belief that 
management, employees and shareholders shared common long-term interests. 
In 2000 the group’s CEO said that ‘we do not believe in “management by 
quarter”, with big dividends, and fragmentation of the business with a view to 
short term profit’. The company refused to pay a dividend at this point, arguing 
that it preferred to fund further investment from growth. According to the UK 
subsidiary’s finance director, interviewed in 2001, the pressure exercised by 
shareholders and banks was to demonstrate ‘credibility of management,’ by 
delivering what was promised over the longer term. 
 
In 2000, the company’s corporate governance environment changed 
significantly as the group’s parent company increased its issued share capital by 
5.1% to fund a number of acquisitions.  The ‘voting’ and ‘capital’ shares were 
merged into a single, voting class. As a result, its shareholder base became 
much more dispersed, with only one pension scheme holding more than 5% of 
the total share capital. The geographical distribution of shares also shifted, with 
only 30% of the shares now held in continental European hands, and 56% in 
British or American ownership.  However, the change did not dilute the 
company’s commitment to partnership with its employees. In 2000, the group 
launched a new human resource strategy as ‘a core element’ of its overall 
business strategy, and set up a new corporate human resources function ‘to 
strengthen its employee development efforts.’ According to the UK finance 
director, the changing structure of share ownership would not become a 
negative factor for partnership because investors ‘know what they are buying 
into’. 
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Other cases in the study also suggest that mature, ‘proactive’ partnership can be 
developed and maintained within the UK corporate governance environment.  
This is indicated by the experience of two utility companies, Warmwell and 
Hearwell.  Warmwell’s personnel director told us, ‘we have excellent relations 
with our trade unions. We sit at the table with them at the national and the local 
level. We ... recognise the value of a legitimate role for the trade unions. Why 
fight? Why go back to the seventies?  If there is a problem, we share the 
problem and the solution.’ At Hearwell, too, the union described a mature 
partnership, explaining that evidence could be found in the fact that over a two-
year period, the company and union had negotiated a complete overhaul of the 
system of grading structures, pay and conditions. In the opinion of the union 
official we interviewed, the result was a win-win situation: the company 
achieved greater flexibility and employees achieved better pay and a reduced 
working week.  Hearwell’s personnel director commented in 1999: ‘I hesitate to 
call it a partnership, although to some extent that’s what it has become.’  
 
Yet both companies had highly dispersed share ownership at this point, and 
continually stressed the importance of delivering value to shareholders.  During 
the period of the study (the late 1990s and early 2000s), both companies also 
pursued strategies designed to pay high dividends relative to earnings.  In 2000 
Warmwell stated that its aim was to increase its dividend by 5% in nominal 
terms over the next three financial years.  At Hearwell, executive bonuses 
depended on maintaining the company’s position in the top thirty UK 
companies, based on delivering total shareholder returns (that is, share price 
growth plus dividend flow) over a five year period.  According to Hearwell’s 
director of strategy, shareholders were the company’s ‘most important’ 
stakeholder group.  
 
Nevertheless, both companies emphasised long-term shareholder value and 
devoted considerable effort to managing shareholder expectations.  Warmwell’s 
1999 annual report described a strategy of concentrating on shareholder value 
over the long term.  Warmwell’s personnel director told us that ‘we spend a lot 
of time trying to educate the stock market on what we’re about…the institutions 
are seeing us in a better light…All of our strategies are about building 
businesses. We believe that you can’t do that in the short term…In every pound 
that we use to acquire or to grow organically, we’re looking for a long term 
return.’  In 1999, Hearwell told us that ‘we have a different shareholder base to 
our competitors. We have a lot of pension funds and so on who are interested in 
long-running, continuing cash flows rather than sparky value appreciation and 
decline … I think the other thing is that we are quite explicit that we are a 
medium term stock.’  
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When Hearwell’s share price fell in response to mounting debts following a 
series of acquisitions and the failure of certain investments to produce expected 
returns, the response of the union was significant.  The union was careful to 
avoid arguing that financial pressures were having a negative effect on labour-
management relations, because, in its view, the need to satisfy financial market 
concerns could ‘distract’ management from developing long-term strategies.  
The union argued that when share prices fell, management was prone to making 
‘knee jerk reactions’ and attacking costs simply to demonstrate to financial 
analysts that some action was being taken.  As a result, the union declined to 
join in public criticism of the company.  Instead, it urged management to be less 
defensive in putting its message across to the financial markets, and to be more 
aggressive in publicising the company’s long-term achievements.  
 
The case studies also demonstrate complexity of the relationship between 
partnership in employment relations and the operation of the market for 
corporate control.  In the case of Warmwell, partnership had, paradoxically, 
been employed as a mechanism to assist the company in the takeover process.  
According to Warmwell’s personnel director, the company’s acquisition of 
another UK utility was made possible by Warmwell’s labour management 
strategy: ‘[we] use our trade unions … to talk with the local unions and say “we 
know you don’t like the idea of being taken over.  We don’t like the idea of you 
being taken over.  But if you’re going to be taken over, it’s better that it’s these 
guys because they know what they’re going to do and they’ll treat you firmly 
but very fairly”’.  A hostile takeover was used in this case to import the 
partnership philosophy into a company which had previously been opposed to 
the concept: after the acquisition was completed, the company reintroduced 
union recognition arrangements which the previous management had removed 
in the wake of privatisation.   
 
The takeover battle was bitterly fought.  Warmwell initiated the bid by making 
an offer to purchase shares in the target company at a premium of almost 40% 
over the then market price.  The essence of its bid was that the target was at that 
point a ‘high cost, high tariff’ utility, which could be run more effectively in the 
future by means of Warmwell’s superior ‘expertise in best practice and cost 
control programmes’.  The target responded in a manner typical of companies 
faced with an unwelcome bid, by attempting to demonstrate to its shareholders 
that it could return sufficient value to them in the short term to retain their 
loyalty.  In effect, this was an effort to counter the bidder’s offer of short-term 
gain (in the form of the premium over the pre-bid market price of the target’s 
shares) with one of its own.  Here, it took the form of a promise to return cash to 
the shareholders which would be generated in large part by a redundancy 
exercise aimed at cutting costs.  Thus halfway through the bid process, the target 
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announced that it would be cutting 17% of its workforce in the then financial 
year, a figure equivalent to over 500 jobs, 200 or so more than had previously 
been announced.  In the event it went even further, dismissing nearly 1,000 
workers while the bid was in progress, including 500 in one day.  However, this 
did not prevent the vast majority of its shareholders from accepting the offer 
tabled by Warmwell, which duly took control.   
 
In this case, a hostile takeover led to a union-unfriendly employer being 
replaced by one which was considerably more receptive to union involvement.   
Whether the bidder would have made redundancies on the same scale as the 
target, had they not been made prior to the bid going through, cannot be known.  
However, the case study suggests, contrary to a widely received view, that 
hostile takeovers may select for stakeholder-friendly firms.  This particular 
aspect of the UK corporate governance system may therefore work in favour of, 
and not against, a partnership agenda.  However, it would seem that for 
partnership to emerge, corporate governance rules must work in conjunction 
with other regulatory influences to create a market environment favourable to 
labour-management partnership.  This is because regulation can act in a way 
which is complementary to corporate governance through its influence on the 
relative position of stakeholder groups within the hierarchy of interests inside 
the enterprise.   
 
An example of this effect can be found in the regulations governing the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), a procedure introduced in the UK in the late 1990s 
under which private capital was made available for large-scale public 
infrastructure projects.  With the objective of ensuring a high quality standard of 
service, PFI regulations introduced for the National Health Service sector at this 
time required evaluation of the employment-relations records of firms who were 
bidding for contracts; they also entitled trade unions to interview and submit a 
report on short-listed bidders. According to the guidelines, the underlying logic 
of this approach was that companies with poor labour relations and inadequate 
investment in staff often delivered a low level of service. We found strong 
evidence of the supportive role of PFI regulation in the NHS in the case of 
Cleanwell UK, which had been highly successful in biding for this type of 
contract (see Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson, 2002: 346).  
 
Utility regulation provides another example.  Although this form of regulation 
gives precedence to customers and the community’s interest in the environment, 
rather than to employees, by setting quality standards it can underpin a 
partnership approach in labour-management relations.  In particular, the 
imposition of guaranteed customer service standards by utility regulators serves 
as a significant support mechanism for partnership because it means that while 
 15 
there are pressures to cut costs, there is a limit to how far these can be permitted 
to undermine standards of customer service. Thus Hearwell’s trade union told us 
that high guaranteed standards of customer service provide an effective 
bargaining tool in negotiations over cost cutting: ‘[t]he vulnerable area is 
customer relationships and if those are disrupted, then there are various means 
through the regulator and other bodies that [the company] will be brought to 
account. So that’s advantageous to us.’  
 
Utility regulation can also extend time horizons by tempering the expectations 
of capital providers and extending operating parameters.  By allowing for 
capital providers ‘a return that is sufficient, but no more than sufficient’ (in the 
words of a union interviewee), these regulations facilitate a longer-term view 
that is conducive to partnership.  Regulators make assessments of the costs of 
debt and equity and of dividend yields in their price determinations.  They also 
set operating parameters for periods of up to five years.   At the same time, 
regulators’ assessments of returns on capital are indicative and not prescriptive; 
regulators determine the level of prices but leave it to companies to manage 
their level of profits. As a result, this form of regulation still provides only a 
very weak support mechanism for partnership in itself; it is open to companies 
operating under this regime to decide whether or not to opt for a proactive 
approach to partnership.  
 
The stress on customer service in utility regulation is nevertheless important in 
encouraging active partnership in conjunction with the operation of the takeover 
mechanism.  Warmwell’s bid for another UK utility company, considered 
above, was assisted by the publication by the regulator of information relating to 
levels of customer service and organisational costs in companies which had 
recently been privatised.  On this basis, Warmwell was able to benchmark its 
own performance against industry standards and identify a suitable target for 
acquisition.  As an interviewee put it to us: 
 
‘The skills that we built through benchmarking were just the same ones 
that we needed to evaluate potential acquisitions… We looked at [the 
target] and said we know what it can do: its costs per customer per 
kilometre of line, its fault rates and so on were all in the public domain 
from the regulatory process.  We knew the international benchmarking 
levels possible from looking at … other leading companies.  We could say 
- if that company was under our control, this is what it would be worth to 
us.  We then looked at what we would have to pay for it.’ 
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Here, the information generated by the regulatory process was used by the 
company to exploit what it considered to be its comparative advantage in being 
better able than the takeover target to meet high standards of service.   
 
In Tenswell, by contrast, over 80% of the workforce was engaged in the 
production of a product where markets were highly volatile and price sensitive 
and there was, at that point, substantial global over-supply.  Regulation had 
been aimed at increasing the intensity of national competition through the 
removal of barriers to trade, and the market was more or less unregulated in 
terms of price and quality standards.  It was these conditions which imposed on 
the company the short-term time horizon under which its management felt it had 
little choice but to ‘return value’ to shareholders by way of plant closures. 
 
Overall, the case studies suggest that corporate governance structures may play an 
important role in shaping partnership, but only in conjunction with other 
regulatory factors.   Regulation of product and service quality, of the kind 
observed in most utility sectors and in certain others, favours the emergence of 
stable partnerships.  This is because, in these markets, profitability is linked to the 
ability of companies to maintain a high and consistent quality of service for end 
users.  As a result, companies are better able to convince shareholders to take the 
view that they will reap significant returns over the long term from a stakeholder 
approach.6  In the absence of these stabilizing factors, however, goodwill between 
labour and management is not enough to sustain a partnership approach when it 
plainly conflicts with shareholder interests.  In this case, the pressure to meet 
shareholder value over the short term tends to prevail.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The evidence which we have presented in this paper suggests that successful 
labour-management partnerships tend to be found in contexts where both sides can 
make credible commitments to cooperate over the medium to long term.  The key 
role played by corporate governance and the regulatory framework is to extend the 
time period over which cooperative strategies can be played out. This can be done 
in a number of ways, most notably through product market regulations which 
encourage competition on the basis of quality rather than price, and through 
employment regulations which grant workers significant voice rights.  Under these 
conditions, managers can develop corporate governance practices which 
encourage shareholders to take a long-term view of their investments.  Where they 
are absent, partnership arrangements are highly vulnerable to shareholder pressure, 
no matter how much goodwill is invested by labour and management.   
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The evidence on which we rely comes from a small sample of firms in sectors 
which are not necessarily typical.  However, longitudinal, micro-institutional case 
studies of the kind reported here provide a particular type of information, relating 
to the internal dynamics of relations between corporate stakeholders, which may 
not otherwise be available.  It is interesting that the picture we get from this type 
of study does not necessarily fit the conventional understanding of the relationship 
between corporate governance and labour relations in the so-called Anglo-
American systems.  In Britain, just as in the US, innovative forms of labour-
management partnership may come under pressure from forces in the corporate 
governance environment.  But failure is not an inevitable outcome, and further 
research may cast light on institutional arrangements which make it possible to 
combine cooperation in labour relations with liquidity in capital markets. 
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Notes
 
1  It is of course the case that the category of ‘shareholders’ includes those who 
have purchased the shares of the original providers of risk capital in the 
‘secondary market’, and that, in the case of most large, listed companies in 
developed economies, the shareholders at any given time may well have made 
no direct contribution to the organisation’s financing.  For discussion of some 
implications of this phenomenon for contemporary corporate governance theory 
and practice, see Deakin, 2005. 
2  As a result of the adoption by the European Union of a directive on takeover 
bids (Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 
April 2004 on Takeover Bids, L 142 Official Journal of the European Union 
30.4.2004), the Panel will, in the near future, acquire certain statutory powers.  
The expectation of the UK government and of the Panel is that this change will 
not have a major impact on the Panel’s mode of operation.  See DTI, 2005, and 
Takeover Panel, 2005b. 
3   This would continue to be the case under the draft legislation put forward by 
the UK government by way of implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive, 
but employee representatives would have new rights to receive information 
from both the bidder and target companies and to state their views on the merits 
of bids.  In addition, the Takeover Panel would in future have as one of its 
members a person with experience of employee relations issues from the 
employees’ perspective.  However, the Panel’s task would continue to be to 
ensure the fair treatment of shareholders.  See DTI, 2005, and Takeover Panel, 
2005b. 
4 For reasons of space it is only possible to report part of the findings here.  For 
an explanation of the composition of the sample and the methodology used, and 
a more complete account of the study, see Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and 
Wilkinson, 2002 and 2005, on which this part of the present paper draws. 
5 Tenswell, like the other names used to designate the case study companies, is a 
fictitious name. 
6   It may, conversely, be the case that shareholders are themselves increasingly 
receptive to this message, by virtue of the need for pension funds, in particular, 
to provide long-term financial stability for their beneficiaries, and that 
regulation can further encourage this development.  A full analysis of this issue 
lies beyond the scope of the present paper; for discussion, see Armour, Deakin 
and Konzelmann, 2003. 
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